It has been strongly recognized that increasing use of information technology (IT) in business operations has increased the risk of cascading failures in interdependent critical infrastructures (CIs). Dependencies are primarily due to services and resources that CIs must provide one another to maintain vital functions of the society. From a crisis management perspective, magnitudes of such interrelationships strongly rely on specific nature of disruptive events. This paper adopts a system dynamics modelling approach for simulation and analysis of disruption scenarios. We seek to characterize CI disruptions according to relevant aspects of risk assessment and response coordination as well as environmental, human, economic and other impact factors. Results are key to the design of a cyber incident early warning system for CI operators.
INTRODUCTION

Background
The increasing reliance on information technology (IT) for business operations increases potential risks that even minor disruptions in a single critical infrastructure (CI) can lead to catastrophic cascade of failures in CI networks (Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley, & Havlin, 2010) . Recent CI readiness surveys confirm that increasing is also the number of cyber attacks that can cause physical damages to CIs (Intel Security, 2015) .
To understand complex dynamics of cascading effects among CIs, modelling and simulation approaches have been largely proposed in literature (Ouyang, 2014) . The majority of existing models abstract from the type of disruptions and rather focus on characterizing CI interdependencies (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001) . One reason may be the lack of available data on cyber incidents and disruptions in CIs. Thus, disruptive events are usually characterized according to primary factors that are relevant for risk assessment; e.g., the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) identifies three main characteristics to describe a disruptive event: scope, magnitude, and time distribution (Mattioli & Levy-Benchton, 2014 ).
In reality, cyber attacks may provoke serious damages to some infrastructures rather than others depending on their objectives and target. From a crisis management perspective, this means that magnitudes of CI interdependencies and cascade effects strongly rely on specific nature of disruptive events. Threats may suddenly increase service demand or reduce capability of specific CIs, consequently increasing the risk of failure of such CIs.
For instance, explosions in a power plant may have more dangerous consequences for humans rather than electricity blackouts; in such cases emergency services and hospital care are crucial to injured people. If crude oil spills into the ocean from a broken pipeline, the impact on environment could be catastrophic; in particular Food CI and Water CI services may be seriously compromised. All these physical disruptions may be caused by sophisticated cyber attacks able to take over programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems of power stations and other CIs. A major example of cyber attack that led to physical damages is the Stuxnet attack to manipulate control systems of the Iranian industrial plant to damage gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment (Langner, 2013) . A cyber security pioneer, Evegeny Kaspersky, has recently revealed that the US Northeast blackout of 2003 was most likely caused by a cyber attack (SPIEGEL ONLINE, 2011).
Contributions of the paper
This paper aims at characterising and modelling disruptive events on the basis of their nature. We demonstrate how specific disruption characteristics influence cascade effects and magnitudes of interdependencies over time.
In modelling, we build on the work of (Canzani, 2016) . The author proposes a block building modelling approach based on system dynamics (SD) to understand disruption dynamics in interdependent CIs. The disruptive event is a function defined according to its magnitude and time components (i.e. disruption duration and time in which the disruption occurs). Our work extends this general characterization by considering disruption impact factors such as human, economic, and environmental impacts.
Of particular interest is to characterise and model disruptive events by a CI operator perspective to enhancing relevant information sharing in case of attacks. Accordingly, we show how simulationbased impact analysis can provide valuable insights for the design of a cyber incident early warning system for CI operators, emphasizing the applicability of our modelling approach.
For illustration purpose, we simulate a scenario of explosion in the energy sector with a major focus on human impact analysis.
By strategically characterising CI disruptions, this work represents a crucial contribution to the field of crisis modeling and management at large.
Related works
Risk assessment and management research has yielded a wide range of quantitative approaches to model CI interdependencies and cascade effects (Casalicchio & Galli, 2008) . However, such general methods do not focus on the specific nature of disruptive events.
A few studies in the literature attempt to identify relevant criteria to characterize catastrophic effects of disruptions. (Lindell & Prater, 2003) provide a qualitative characterization of community impacts of natural disasters. A detailed case study of how water disruption impacts urban economy is presented in (Chang, Svekla, & Shinozuka, 2002) .
In general, such qualitative descriptions and empirical studies (Luiijf, Nieuwenhuijs, Klaver, Eeten, & Cruz, 2010) do not investigate the links between disruption characteristics and the way damage effects are cascading into CI networks. A first attempt to address this deficiency is the work of (Theoharidou, Kotzanikolaou, & Gritzalis, 2009 Security, 2009 ). We move a step forward by proposing a quantitative approach to modelling dynamic features of CI interdependencies according to such impact criteria.
Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the research questions that motivate our work by combining the relevant fields of crisis modeling and cyber security. Then, Section 3 briefly introduces the block building modelling framework we take from to improve the understanding of cascading failures in CI networks. We extend this modelling approach by characterizing disruptive events according to relevant information and impact criteria as explained in Section 4. An example of disruption scenario with human impact is given in Section 5. The scenario is used to perform a simulation-based impact analysis and results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes with main remarks and an outline of future research directions.
MOTIVATION
This paper pulls together synergies of crisis modeling and cyber security research to contribute to the design of an early warning and incident response system for improving critical infrastructure protection (CIP) plans.
In crisis modelling, research questions that motivate our work are: how does the nature of disruptions and cyber incidents influence cascading effects? How do magnitudes of interdependencies vary according to different types of disruptive events? Toward the development of a reliable early warning system to support cyber security of CIs, questions we address are: what is the importance of a CI operator with respect to the system of CIs? What is relevant incident information sharing to gain situational awareness among CI operators?
We refer in particular to the ECOSSIAN mission to timely coordinate the response of CI operators in Europe in case of cyber attacks (Kaufmann, Hutter, Skopik, & Mantere, 2014) . A layered security approach is proposed for relevant information sharing between Security Operations Centres (SOCs) at operator, national, and European levels (O-SOC, N-SOC and E-SOC respectively) (Settanni et al., 2015) . We extend the ECOSSIAN framework by using a crisis modelling and management methodology of (Canzani, 2016) Our objective is to characterise and model disruptive events by a CI operator perspective. We show how simulation-based impact analysis can provide valuable insights for the ECOSSIAN ecosystem, emphasizing the applicability of our modelling approach. By strategically characterising CI disruptions, this work represents a crucial contribution to the field of crisis modeling and management at large.
MODELING FRAMEWORK
In modelling, we refer to the block building approach of (Canzani, 2016) . The author develops a system dynamics (SD) model for impact analysis in CI networks by iteratively developing and extending blocks of models, which are then assembled together during the modelling process. This approach allows breaking down the overall complexity by focusing on relevant dynamics of the interconnected system of CIs. In particular, three building blocks are developed:
 Block 1 -disruptive event dynamics,  Block 2 -operational dynamics of single CI,  Block 3 -interdependencies between CIs.
These building blocks are used to generate scenarios in three simple steps as follows. First, we determine which infrastructures to consider in our network and model their internal operational dynamics (Block 2). Then, dynamic dependencies (edges) across CIs (nodes) are identified based on services and products CIs provide one another (Block 3). Lastly, disruptive events (Block 1) in one or more CIs are modeled to assess different crisis scenarios via SD simulation.
A general disruptive event is replicated with a PULSE function, which takes as input parameters the moment of time when the disruption occurs (Disruption Time) and its duration (Disruption Duration). Besides time-dependent aspects, disruptive events have a certain magnitude depending on their nature. Therefore, a disruption magnitude factor (Disruption Magnitude) is defined to assess the intensity of the disruption in a scale of 0 (no disruption) to 10 (infrastructure breakdown). The disruption function is then obtained by multiplying the Disruption Magnitude by the PULSE function.
For mathematical details on building blocks, see (Canzani, 2016) . Insights on system dynamics theory can be found in the seminal book of (Sterman, 2000) .
DISRUPTION CHARACTERIZATION
We extend now the SD model of (Canzani, 2016) by characterising specific nature of disruptions.
After defining the disruption function according to information that are relevant for CI operators, a major emphasis is given to the identification of such impact factors that would help CI operators to gain situational awareness through an early warning system such as in ECOSSIAN.
The final attempt is to demonstrate via scenario simulation how disruption characteristics influence cascade effects and magnitudes of interdependencies over time. Consequently, dynamic aspects of CI interdependencies are highlighted.
Time components
Concerning the relevant component of time, disruptive events can be characterized by setting time parameters of the SD model.
In addition to Disruption Time and Disruption
Duration (see Section 3), the disrupted operator must be able to give information on Expected Time to Recovery and about delays (if any) with which the recovery started (Delay Recovery). This is implemented with SD tools using a STEP function that considers time lags between Disruption Time and Start Recovery (i.e. the time in which response actions start).
Note that for demonstration purpose this paper uses the time factors defined above in a deterministic length. However, the SD model allows to easily test disruption scenarios using stochastic durations and statistical distributions of recovery time.
Magnitude assessment
By a perspective of CI operators, the magnitude of the disruption (Disruption Magnitude) is characterised as follows:
Disruption Magnitude varies from 0 to 10 as a result of two input parameters to characterise the disruption, i.e.
(i)
Damage Estimation, which is a value from 0 to 10 given by the disrupted operator to assess magnitude of disruption effects in its own organization;
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(ii) Operator Importance, which is a factor that scales the disruption damage with respect to the "a priori importance" of the disrupted operator in providing a specific critical service to the CI. It ranges from 0 to 1 according to the piece of market segment the operator owns among others with respect to a specific critical service to be provided to the CI.
Arguments on operator-driven approaches are in (Mattioli & Levy-Benchton, 2014) . Note that "a priori importance" of CI operators is part of the general information that must be available to N-SOCs in advance in ECOSSIAN scenarios. Thus, magnitudes of disruptive events can be assessed using the matrix in Figure 1 . 
Impact factors
To gain situational awareness and coordinate response actions, it is also crucial that disrupted operators inform the N-SOCs about potential consequences of the cyber attack. The ECOSSIAN ecosystem suggests accounting for potential human, environmental, economic and other consequences in assessing scenarios of disruption. Accordingly, we define impact criteria corresponding to relevant cyber incident information that O-SOCs must report to the NSOCs. They are as follows.
 Human impact factor, which estimates emergency and health care services needed both immediately and in the postdisruption phase based on the fraction of population affected.
 Environmental impact factor, which assesses pollution effects and other longterm damages to the environment.  Economic impact factor, which attempts to evaluate whether the national economy may be compromised due to information disclosed by the cyber activist.
The disrupted operator rates impacts in a scale of 0 to 10, these factors are used as input parameters of the SD model. Then, the SD model dynamically calculates the magnitudes of interdependencies over the time horizon. In modelling, we use a SMOOTH function to replicate perturbations of service demand, and a PULSE function to estimate magnitudes, short-term and long-term effects of human impacts.
The disruption scenario example we provide in the next section focuses on human consequences. Further potential consequences may be identified and considered in the model. For example, ENISA guidelines (Mattioli & Levy-Benchton, 2014) suggest considering public confidence and public order as impact criteria to assess dependencies.
DISRUPTION SCENARIO
We propose the analysis of simulation examples of disruption scenarios with different impacts on humans to show how to extend the ECOSSIAN framework. We demonstrate that the identification of impact factors allows a better understanding of the nature of cascading effects. Magnitude of cascade failures are primarily assessed through a weighted connection matrix (or interdependency matrix) that identifies first-order interdependencies on the basis of services and products that CIs must provide one another to guarantee their normal operational state.
The SD model calculates nonlinear dynamics of higher-order interdependencies. This means that even do the connection matrix shows no dependency between Water CI and Financial CI, damage effects of a disruption in one of those infrastructures (e.g. Water CI) may cascade into the other (Financial CI) over time. It may be the case of a power plant that, not receiving water for cooling, is not anymore able to provide electricity services to banking and financial systems. The model is able to capture in this case the secondorder dependency between Water CI and Financial CI through the Energy CI. Figure 2 on the right depicts a scenario with four CIs (green nodes) and a general disruptive event in the Energy CI. Links (dotted arrows) correspond to the weighted connection matrix in Table 1 that assesses first-order interdependencies in a scale of 0 to 5 using results of a latest survey of CI experts (Laugé, Hernantes, & Sarriegi, 2015) . Using the same baseline scenario, Figure 2 on left describes potential effects that an explosion in the Energy CI may have on other CIs. In particular, human consequences are highlighted. We assume  higher demand for emergency calls that may increase the risk of failure of telecommunication networks, especially in the initial disruption phase;  need of first aid services during the disruption and hospital care for injured people that may persist in the period postcrisis.
As consequence, dependences of Telecom and Health CIs on the Energy CI get stronger in case of disruptions with direct impacts on humans such as an explosion (cf. full arrows in Figure 2 ). 
SIMULATION RESULTS
We simulate disruption scenarios in Figure 2 to show how our SD model captures dynamics of interdependencies and how their magnitudes change according to human impacts. A simulationbased impact analysis is performed by varying the human impact factor of a disruptive event in the ≤10.
We use DSS Vensim software package (Ventana Systems, Inc.) for system dynamics simulation.
Initial model setting
Initial model parameters and roles of reporting data in the ECOSSIAN context are listed in Table 2 . 
Damage Estimation
O-SOC 5
Operator Importance
Simulations were launched over 2 week period with an hourly time scale (i.e. INITIAL TIME = 0 and FINAL TIME = 336 Hours).
Output graphs
We obtain the output graphs in Figure 3 
Analysis of the results
We analyze output graphs in Figure 3 and compare scenarios to emphasize changes of cascading effects according to disruption characteristics.
In Scenario 1 we may assume a target cyber attack to a power plant, which exploits vulnerabilities of SCADA systems to cut off electricity supplies. The power outage causes operational disruptions of all the other CIs. The Financial services can be provided at about 95% for one day during the disruption. The system is able to absorb the damage before cascading into Telecom and Health services, which have big power generators to prevent blackouts in their CIs.
Scenario 2 replicates a cyber incident that trigger a small explosion in the power station. People try to call emergency services to save their life. Overloaded telecommunication networks are unable to provide 20% of services at moment the disruption occurs and the day after until get back to normal operations. As the Financial CIs relies both on power and telecommunication services, financial services are damaged up to 10% and for longer period than Scenario 1. The Health CI is not fully operative due to the lack of electricity, while injured people lead to an increase of health service demand. Consequently, capabilities of emergency services (during the explosion) and hospitals (in the post-disruption phase) result inadequate.
A bigger explosion is simulated in Scenario 3. With respect to Scenario 1 in which only financial services get disrupted, we observe exponential increases of both Health and Telecommunication service interruptions up to about 50% and 40% respectively. The reason is that the Financial CI can still effort the lack of power services, and cascading effects are mainly affecting those CIs that are crucial for limiting catastrophic human consequences of an explosion.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper seeks to model dynamic cascade of failures in critical infrastructure (CI) networks by characterizing the nature of disruptive events. With a special focus on physical damages triggered by cyber attacks, we seek to provide a valuable contribution to the design of a cyber incident early warning and response system for CI operators.
In modeling, the system dynamics (SD) modeling approach of (Canzani, 2016 ) is improved to understand more complex scenarios of disruptions.
In particular, we characterize disruptive events by a perspective of CI operators. We introduce a matrix to assess magnitude of disruptions according to the a priori importance of CI operators. Human, economic and environmental consequences are identified as impact criteria to influence magnitudes of interdependencies between CIs and dynamics of cascading effects.
A first example of simulation-based impact analysis is presented with a special focus on human impacts; future works aim at real-world application of the SD model in the ECOSSIAN context.
